Will Government
Allow the Diamond Cutting Industry to Perish?
‘Diarough
which owns Teemane in Serowe, will continue to operate its Bhopal factory in
India as well as its factory in Thailand and neither they nor De Beers will suffer the consequences of the job
losses in Botswana.’
For the
diamond cutting industry the news last week could hardly have been much worse.
In January the press reported that MotiGanz and Leo Schachter had laid off 150
workers. Then last week a bombshell was dropped at Teemane Manufacturing
Company owned by Diarough would close
with the loss of some 320 jobs in Serowe. This is the bigesst employer in the
village of Serowe and the consequences
will be felt for years to come and for what are probably around 2,000
people who are dependents of those employed in the industry. With a total
reported employment in the diamond cutting and polishing industry of 3,750 in
2014 this was a massive retrenchment and will cause real pain to many thousands
of low income Batswana. This is a time of great sorrow and pain in many
households in Botswana.
Low Productivity and High Costs
In 2013
Botswana is reported to have exported P6.6 billion of polished diamonds
making it by far the biggest
manufacturing exporter in the country. Two reasons are commonly given for the
sudden rash of closures in Botswana’s diamond sector. The first is quite correctly a structural one-
Botswana, like Namibia and South Africa, is simply not competitive in
comparison to low cost and high productivity locations like Surat and Mumbai
where most of the world’s diamonds are cut. The second is the squeezed margins.
Wages in Botswana are about the same as they are in India but the differences
are in the productivity. Indian cutters
will produce 2-3 times as much as those in Botswana. This is correct but not new and it has been
well known since before the establishment of the industry in the 1990’s. The
table below presents the costs cutting and polishing a rough diamond in various
locations. Botswana has become more
competitive over time but it just cannot compete with India yet but it is a
more competitive location than either South Africa or Namibia.
Cost of Processing in Botswana Compared to Other Diamond Cutting Centres
Approximate Cutting and Polishing Costs (USD/crt)
|
Approximate Total Cutting and Polishing Jobs
|
Comment
|
|||
2008
|
2013
|
2008
|
2013
|
||
Canada
|
125
|
140(NWT)
|
300
|
50-80
|
|
180(Ontario)
|
|||||
Botswana
|
45-125
|
60-120
|
2200
|
3750
|
Diamond producing countries gaining market on the back of
|
Namibia
|
45-125
|
60-140
|
1500
|
970
|
government policy, despite higher costs than
traditional manufacturing locations
|
Belgium
|
120
|
150+
|
1000
|
150-200
|
Old cutting locations have lost share of manufacturing following
|
US
|
110
|
300
|
100
|
80-100
|
migration first low cost locations
|
South Africa
|
60-100
|
130-150
|
1800
|
1000
|
and subsequently to producer
|
Israel
|
47->55
|
140-->300
|
2000
|
400
|
countries
|
Far East
|
15-35
|
20-50
|
29,000
|
10,000
|
The trend of growth in low-cost
|
India
|
6-50
|
10-50
|
850,000
|
800,000
|
locations has recently started to reverse
|
Source: De Beers 2014 ‘Diamond Insight
Report’ page 40
Decreasing Rough-Polished margins
This
structural lack of competitiveness of Botswana and the rest of southern Africa has
meant that, despite growth in employment in Botswana over the last few years, they are now all ‘going south’ in terms of employment in the industry.
But what has changed to make it necessary to close so many factories and to lay
off thousands of workers across the continent? As can be seen from the chart
below since about July 2012 the margins between the price of rough diamonds and
0.5 carat polished diamonds have been narrowing. Even in good times it is said
that Botswana’s diamond manufacturers are not
able to make a profit on diamonds that are much smaller than half a carat polished.
This narrowing of margins has given rise to some increasingly bad tempered exchanges between Mr Philippe Mellier, the CEO of the De Beers Group and the head of the International Diamond Manufacturers’ Association, Maxim Shkadov, who in January this year claimed that the margins of his members are close to zero. The diamond cutting industry has also fallen victim world wide to a limiting of bank credit to the industry which has made it even more difficult to operate.
…and a bad deal for Botswana and southern
Africa
So gross
margins are falling in the cutting industry and diamond manufacturers are
closing their highest cost operations in Southern Africa. No surprises in any
of this except for the fact that the deal that the Government of Botswana made
with De Beers in 2004 and revised in 2011 specifically required diamantaire who
were DTC (Botswana) sightholders to cut and polish in Botswana. Under this deal
these sightholders would eventually get $800 million worth of rough to process
here in Botswana. But these sightholders are not fools, they knew at the time
that Botswana is a high cost location,
so why did they set up here ? Industry sources have claimed that in the past the
DTCB sightholders would get thrown a ‘special stone’ by De Beers occasionally
to compensate them for locating in Botswana.
These stones are multi-million dollar diamonds and the profits from one is
often enough to compensate producers for low productivity in Botswana. De Beers
strongly denied this at the time but now this practice has certainly come to an
end. In 2012, the last year before diamond exports figures became confused with
re-exports associated with aggregation, Botswana exported some $4 billion of
diamonds.
If $800
million or so goes to DTCB sightholders what happens to the other $3 billion
that Botswana produces? Well De Beers has many sightholders, 84 according to
its web site of which some 21are in manufacturing in Botswana. The rest take
their diamonds in what is one of the other four boxes i.e. Namibia, South
Africa and Canada where some of these De Beers sightholders have beneficiation obligations.
But a large chunk of all the diamonds produced in southern Africa go into what
used to be called the ‘London box’ which,
since the move to Gaborone is called, an ‘international sight’. Therefore sightholders
may get up to 5 boxes of diamonds at
the Gaborone sights every 10 weeks. But
the so-called London or international box can be sent anywhere for processing and so
in a bear market for polished diamonds, such as is presently the case, the
local manufacturers, many of whom have access to a London box, can simply close
their factories in Botswana, lose access to their Botswana box but still
continue production in India or China.
As Chaim Even
Zohar, the guru of the diamond industry, pointed out in a recent statement on
the 2004 agreement ‘There were penalties to be paid
if the targets (of beneficiation) were not reached. In the current (2011)
contract, I understand, the US$ value of local rough sales are still
contractually agreed, but there is no agreed minimum employment level’. This was done to allow the
companies to use highly automated machinery but will have effect of allowing
these sightholders and De Beers to get off without the sorts of fines in the earlier agreement.
What has
happened to the diamond cutting industry is what economists call ‘regulatory
failure’. The closure of the factories in Botswana would probably never have
occurred if our agreement with De Beers had said that firms that do not beneficiate
a portion of their sites in Southern Africa cannot have access to southern
African diamonds … full stop. But instead we have created a complex marketing formula
which made the cost of exiting Botswana in the current bear market very low
indeed. The firms that closed their doors will continue to have access to Botswana’s
diamonds. Thus in a sense the situation where De Beers was claimed to have
‘subsidized rough with rough’ has now been reversed … Botswana provides rough for
Indian industry at the cost of our evaporating polished diamond industry. If we
had an arrangements which said that only those firms operating plants in
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa can have access to De Beers African diamonds
the plant in Serowe would probably be open today.
Diarough which
owns Teemane Manufacturing Company in Serowe, will continue to operate its
Bhopal factory in India as well as its factory in Thailand and they nor De
Beers will suffer the consequences of the job losses. Was this foreseen at the
time the agreement with De Beers was signed in 2011? Almost certainly not – it
was what economists call an ‘unintended consequence’ of the negotiated
marketing system.
Similarly
Botswana has imposed beneficiation obligations on De Beers but at the same time
we are exempting state owned companies like Okavanago or private ones like
Lucara and Gem Diamonds from the same obligations. The buyers from these
companies can take their stones and cut in India and so it is becoming easier
and easier to get Botswana diamonds without any beneficiation. In this way government
policy encourages diamond trading but undermines
our beneficiation efforts.
Policy Failure- Infant industries and Delinquent parents
Most of humanity enjoys making
babies… or at least trying. The unfortunate consequence of success is some 20
years of nurturing an infant until it has reached a level of maturity and
effectiveness in the world where it can stand on its own feet. That is the
minimal definition of a good and fit parent. A delinquent parent abandons the
infant at birth without paying the bills, taking the responsibility for proper
nurture and assuring proper discipline and gets on with making even more
infants. This is an unfortunate but nonetheless good metaphor for the history
of industrial policy in Botswana and much of the region. Over 35 years Botswana
has created many ‘infant industries’ as they are known in economics and they
have almost all been abandoned at birth without the requisite hard work and
money to make them work. What we know from the Asian experience of
industrialization is that setting up the ‘infant industry’ is the sexy part of
policy- but the expensive, boring and very unsexy part is spending the huge
amount of money, effort and time and imposing the discipline to make your
infant an effective and competitive adult. Most countries fail and that is why
they do not develop.
I was reminded by a colleague
that some eighteen months ago we attended a meeting between government, the
diamond manufacturers association and the other stakeholders who met to form a
diamond industry ‘cluster’. We talked about the need to improve productivity
but to the best of our knowledge,
nothing ever happened. If Botswana continues to conduct industrial policy
towards the diamond cutting and polishing industry in this manner then it will
go the same way as the clothing industry and the automobile industry. We need
to work with the private sector, the unions and spend what it takes to assure
that our workers are effective and competitive. Industrial policy, like raising
children, is not a free lunch. In the end diamond cutting must occur here in
Botswana because it is a great place to do business but that is not today but
may be the product of 20 years of hard work to create a developed competitive
and vibrant industry.
In the
meantime it is certainly time for Botswana, Namibia and South Africa to
reconsider their agreements with De Beers and see what can be done to assure that diamond
beneficiation in Southern Africa occurs in the way it was intended.
These are the views of Professor Roman
Grynberg and not necessarily those of any institution with which he is
affiliated.
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