Monday, 24 August 2020

Mozambique's Beneficiation - Lessons for Africa

                                         Mozambique's Beneficiation - Lessons for Africa 


What can Namibia and other African countries possibly  learn from Mozambique? It has been ranked by Transparency International in 2019 as the 146th place out of 180 countries in terms of official corruption. To give you an idea of how bad that is it is on par with Nigeria. This compared to 56th for Namibia in 2019 but that was before fishrot. Mozambique has become so corrupt that the old revolutionary slogan Á Lutta Continua’ has been translated by the wags into English as ‘The looting continues’ 
There are few iron laws in Economics as virtually everything is contested. Economists disagree on just about everything but where there is agreement amongst most economists that if you want to escape the miserable fate of being a supplier of raw materials to help the development of other richer and more developed nations then you have to pay. The poorer and less developed you are the more you will pay to make the transformation. When you open just about any policy document in Africa written nationally, regionally  or on pan-African basis there will be a sanctimonious ‘waya waya’ Tangen- what is the word  in Oshiwambo) about their commitment to beneficiating raw materials ie adding value to raw minerals or agricultural products. African leaders simply don’t mean what they say because they know that as much as they hate their predicament Africa exists largely to supply China (and India when it comes to gold and diamonds) which will then beneficiate our raw materials.

And if Africa really wants to beneficiate its raw materials its peoples will have to pay and some of the politicians know this but are completely unwilling to tell people the truth- you are poor miserable and bedraggled and you cant compete with the Chinese and if you want to you will have to pay to become competitive. This is as true of gold and diamonds as it is for base metals like zinc and copper and nickel.
Occasionally governments find ways to make their citizens pay for their transformation in ways that do not do offense or less obvious to the hip pocket nerve i..e the wallet. At the end of the last century Mozambique was simply toxic in terms of the international business community. It was a war torn, impoverished cashew nut exporting country that had undergone two decades of liberation struggle and civil war. How do you transform such an economy, you ask? The answer is you pay!
In order to get itself put on the international investment Mozambique map ,it and the IFC offered BHP-Billiton,' the big ( we usually add ugly) Australian’ a deal it could not refuse. Mozambique or more correctly South Africa’s Eskom would sell electricity to BHP for an aluminum smelter it would establish in Maputo Bay at a cost of some  US$1.5 billion and create quality employment for over 1000 Mozambican workers. It would eventually grow to a capacity of over 500,000 tonnes of aluminum per annum. BHP would pay no more than 1% turnover tax to the government of Mozambique and get electricity at some of the lowest prices on the planet.
Aluminum is a strange commodity and to produce it you need to add a great deal of cheap electricity to bauxite which in the case of Mozambique came from Australia. In a normal year 60% of the cost of a tonne of aluminum is the electricity used to smelt it. Thus Mozambique was putting its huge hydroelectric capacity at Caborra Bassa on the Zambezi to use beneficiating BHP’s bauxite. Bauxite is normally shipped around the world hunting for cheap electricity and smelters which exist in places like Quebec and Iceland where electricity is cheap.
Once  the Mozal facility came into existence it became a classic export enslave with almost no direct economic connection to Mozambique but what it did was to transform Mozambique from an impoverished cashewnut economy to a significant industrial exporter in one swoop. More importantly it established the country’s reputation as a place where large transnational firms could do business despite the country’s ranking as one of the most corrupt countries in Africa. For natural resources businesses corruption is just a cost and in the resource sector a normal daily issue. One megaproject after another has followed from Mozal- gas coal, iron and steel.
The route that Mozambique has taken has given rise to a skewed and unbalanced economy but the results remains the envy of much of Africa. For years the economists who advised government in Mozambique tried to push backward linkages ie what Mozal purchased from the rest of the economy. The neo-liberals would look for any sign of these type of linkages even beer consumption by Mozal’s workers. They hated the very idea of beneficiation as it flew in the face of what the World Bank and rest of international community was telling Mozambique. But Mozal remained an almost complete enclave with no real developmental connection until recently when Bahrain based Midal,one of the world’s biggest aluminum wire and rod makers set up a factory just outside Mozal and started producing wire for export to Europe and Africa.
Why invest in Mozambique you ask? Several good commercial reasons. First Mozambique has duty free access to the EU market under the EPA, it has relatively abundant electricity at a reasonable price for business and most importantly it had the aluminum. No-one should imagine that BHP helped. In fact Midal had approached BHP to buy molten aluminum from the smelter to make cable as early as 2002. BHP’s response was very negative arguing it would only supply ingots and at prices based on London fob prices even though the factory was next door. This was because it was supplying aluminum to a South African subsidiary and other suppliers and did not want to improve the competitiveness of a global firm. Furthermore it is insisted on charging prices as though it were selling to London and not next door. Here the Mozambican officials that negotiated with BHP made a serious mistake and should have followed what Botswana did with its Nickel mine and forced the producer to include a clause in its off-take agreement which gave priority to local use. Eventually BHP sold off its South African assets and in 2014 agreed to supply Midal with molten aluminum at the ex-factory price rather than the London price.
Now Mozambique is one step further along the path to diversification and beneficiation. As much as the free marketeers hate it- Mozambique has started to make beneficiation work. As many 160 workers work in the Midal plant and it is using Mozambican electricity and aluminum to export high value added and very profitable cable. Will the people of Mozambique benefit – not from taxes as Midal operates in a tax free zone and so the Mozambicans will pay for moving up the value chain.
These are the views of Professor Roman Grynberg and not UNAM where he is employed.

Covid, Africa and the IMF

 Covid, Africa and the IMF 

At its peak in 2015 Namibia’s GDP/capita, the most widely used measure of our standard of living, was US 6,275, per person and public debt was a mere 32 % of GDP. By 2021 public debt will be 69% of GDP, which is at about the average of sub-Saharan Africa. GDP/capita in 2019 in US dollars was $5766 and  is projected to decrease by approximately 7%  in 2020 to about US$ 5350. In other words by the end of the year you will be 15% poorer in US dollars than you were in 2015 and that was without taking into account the effects of inflation.   

If all of that is depressing and making you conclude that the economic future in Namibia is bleak and if you want to feel better about Namibia, at least for a day or two,  then you should compare our situation to that of oil rich Angola, copper rich Zambia and diamond, gold, platinum and chromium rich Zimbabwe. Once you do this you will feel much better about Namibia’s economic situation but it should become clear that we are not far behind our neighbors 

Angola had a debt/GDP ratio of 111% before Covid- 19. Zambia with persistent fiscal deficits increased general government debt to 88% of GDP in 2019, up from 32% in 2014. All this was before Covid and expectations are that debt will rise in Zambia to around 100% GDP in 2021. In Zimbabwe the  Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit has recently said that “The public sector debt to GDP ratio including legacy debt and farmers’ compensation jumps from about 51,8% estimated for 2019 to a projection of about 101,6% in 2020.  

The IMF claims that it has been very generous with concessional loans to those member countries which have had to lock-down their economies to combat the virus. The IMF has created a US$50 billion facility to help countries suffering from the economic effects of Covid 19.  But the generosity does not extend to those that are already virtually bankrupt. Zambia has been told that with a debt/GDP ratio of 100% that it should not bother asking. Zimbabwe with similar levels of debt, 1000% inflation (yet again) and significant debt arrears to other banks has no-one willing to give it loans.  

Patrick Imam, the IMF country representative in Zimbabwe, was quoted as saying that “the $50 billion facility provides grants to cover upcoming debt services to the IMF. Now given that Zimbabwe’s debt to the IMF is zero, there is no debt service to pay, and hence the facility would not be of any use.” He went on to say IMF offered funds to member countries severely impacted by Covid-19, such as the Rapid Credit Facility, were currently not available to any country that was in debt distress or had arrears to international financial institutions (IFIs). “Zimbabwe still has arrears to multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank, AfDB, and the European Development Bank,” Imam explained. “IMF rules do not permit us to provide financial support in these circumstances. Thus, before becoming eligible for financial support from the IMF, Zimbabwe will need to clear these arrears.” 

 Before the Covid 19 outbreak the African Development Bank had written “ More than 60% of the (Zimbabwe) population falls below the poverty line, while income inequality remains high. Employment opportunities continue to dwindle. About 2 million people in the rural areas were food insecure in April–June 2019—expected to rise to 5.5 million in January–March 2020—with 2.0 million more affected in urban areas” 

The IMF has this week approved South Africa's request for a US$4.3 billion (R70 billion) loan to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic. The request for emergency financial support is under the Rapid Financing Instrument and will help the country to mitigate the adverse social and economic impact of the pandemic. South Africa has also taken loans from the New Development Bank and the African Development Bank of $1 billion (R17.3 billion) and R5 billion respectively. 

In Namibia the government has never taken any loans from the IMF, because  it was unnecessary and the normal terms and conditions that are imposed by the IMF are generally considered so iopposed to the country’s ideology. Namibianormally  takes its loans from other institutions such as the African Development Bank and it is not in arrears to other IFIs it could get a loan from the IMF . Namibia almost the day after South Africa's approval has now sought a loan from the IMF of N$4.5 billion for the Covid 19 pandemic and Mr Shiimi, the Minister of Finance would not have announced it if it were not a foregone conclusion.  

Many virologists are now warning that a second and much worse outbreak of Covid 19 can be expected in the northern winter beginning in November. This means further lockdowns in the northern hemisphere  and therefore we can expect the Covid economic crisis to continue well into 2021 and 2022 and possibly even longer. Given that the US is being run by an administration of the most limited ability and intellect and Covid 19 is ravaging that country in large part because of the policy failures of the administration, international investors have turned away from the US dollar as a traditional safe haven and moved to gold which is now trading close to US$2000 per ounce.  

Assuming the virologists are correct Namibia, along with rest of Africa, can now expect at least two years of more economic decline and increased public debt.  By that time if we continue to raise debt as we have in the last year Namibia, like all of its neighbors will be in a major economic crisis. At that point we will either have to go to the IMF for a loan because the other international banks will no longer continue to accept such high risks of further loans or, far worse, we will follow the disastrous route followed by the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe and we will decouple from the rand and print nollars (Namibian dollars). While Mugabe’s economic policy created hyperinflation, sent millions of Namibians into economic exile and much of the remainder into poverty and hunger it did enrich some party officials who had access to foreign exchange at the official and black market rates. As a result this disastrous policy of printing money cannot be entirely discounted as an option the government might take in Namibia.  

These are the views of Professor Roman Grynberg and Mr Lukas Kumonika and not  necessarily those of UNAM where they are employed.  

The Hierarchy of Bribery and Corruption

                                        The Hierarchy of Bribery and Corruption  


Namibia’s Fishrot scandal where bribes were allegedly  paid to ministers for access to our exclusive economic zone is not at all surprising. Of all the natural resource sectors in the world the capture fisheries is, in 40 years of experience, the most corrupt. Indeed there is a pecking order of corruption and bribery by industry with the capture fisheries being by far  the worst followed by logging of natural forests and then petroleum and lastly there is mining. There are sound economic and commercial reasons why this pecking order exists. The corruption that we observe is usually of the variety where a minister or someone even higher gets a bribe in order to give access to a foreign or local company to a scarce natural resource.   

Fisheries is the most corrupt natural resource because the cash flow and profits that you derive from getting access to a rich fisheries resource, such as that found in the Namibian EEZ, is very large in proportion to what you have to invest. In many countries all you have to do is bribe a minister to get a quota of fish you can catch and then transfer the fish at sea to a freezer vessel, where this is still legal. If you have this access you immediately make a profit because there is no added investment. You own the trawler or purse seiner and you can hire a freezer vessel but if you have access to fish you can make a profit almost immediately because there is no investment and so cash flow is positive almost from very outset. Indeed you have to pay the minister a bribe for the access but the minister normally shares the bribe with the permanent secretary (PS) and several key ministers in cabinet. If the fisheries minister is greedy and tries to kees the whole bribe and does not share then invariably his cabinet colleagues will sabotage the deal or worse the PS, if he knows what is happening in his own department, may inform on the minister to the anti-corruption authority. If you are a corrupt businessman the risks are minimal because if things go pear shaped and you get caught there is nothing to seize; you just take your vessel and sail off to Iceland or some other destination or to the next corrupt coastal state.  

The logging of natural forests is almost as corrupt as fisheries but because you actually have to invest in machinery in the country to extract the logs then the costs are higher and potential losses greater. Those involved in the industry have to get all sorts of permits from the ministry to log the forest, from customs to export raw logs and the ministry of finance where you have to get tax clearance. This requires bribes to several ministries with slightly greater risks of being caught. What fisheries and logging have in common is that they are often conducted by small obscure firms that do not consider their reputational risk of being caught giving bribes. This is often untrue for petroleum and mining majors.  

Historically , the petroleum sector has been notoriously corrupt because of the formula of access equals almost immediate profits can be very true. If you discover  an “elephant” in the petroleum industry i.e. a deposit of 100 million barrels or more then the formula holds or at least held until the recent price decreases. The briber will begin with the relevant ministers which include energy and finance. But these enormous finds are becoming ever more rare. However, even if one finds a relatively small but commercial deposit commonly a bribe to the minister will be necessary to assure access to the resource even in those cases where the explorer has what appears to be an iron clad agreement with the government. If you don’t pay the bribe then there are many legitimate ways   that a minister can create troubles and halt a project. If the deposit is near an existing pipeline then the oil field will prove very profitable almost immediately and as in the fisheries, there will be very little up-front cost and high and immediate cash flow from the project. As a result oil companies will compete with bribes to ministers and officials for blocks near a known deposit for that very reason.   

Mining is widely seen as being a large source of great corruption and bribery in Africa. This is certainly so in some countries and with some commodities such as alluvial diamonds and gold. However large scale mining is a different sort of business to petroleum. Even where you find say a huge gold deposit it often takes many years to turn a profit so bribing a  minister or a PS in the standard way simply won’t work because they are often not in office long periods. Mining companies tend to bribe by offering important officials or their relatives and proxies tenders or contracts to supply food, security or cleaning for the mine. Because there is nothing as impermanent as a permanent secretary then when he or she is replaced the contract can be terminated and transferred to another PS or their relatives.  

In both petroleum and mining increasing the major firms have diminished their reputational risk of bribery by leaving the matter of development of a project to the ‘juniors’ in the industry. Increasingly these juniors will not only discover the deposit but more recently move to develop the project to at least what is called the ramp up stage. It is in this stage that most access bribes have to be paid to ministers but the juniors face almost no reputational risk as they normally are small firms that have no reputation and can disappear from the stock exchange easily. For Exxon, Shell or Anglo and BHP-Billiton to be caught bribing a minister is quite another matter as heads will roll if the bribery is discovered. Once the mine or oil field is up and running then the majors step in and buy the project from the junior. 

The developed world continually lectures Africa about the need for transparency to combat corruption. Certainly more transparent commercial arrangements help and are important but there is no bribe or kickback that cannot be hidden in the world of tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions tolerated and often created by the same developed countries that lecture Africa. The real cause of the corruption is the very industries to which Africans are confined. The production of automobiles and refrigerators tend not to be as corrupt as the resource sector with its massive and immediate positive cash flow which facilitates bribery.  The same is true of the investment intensive aquaculture sector and sustainable logging. As long as Africa leaders are happy to remain the ‘hewers of wood and the drawers of water’ for the developed world and China hen the bribery will continue.